The Doctrine of Official Immunity and Section 1983: A New Look
at an Old Problem by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 2 Article 10
Summer 6-1-1973
The Doctrine of Official Immunity and Section
1983: A New Look at an Old Problem
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Doctrine of Official Immunity and Section 1983: A New Look at an Old Problem, 30 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 344 (1973), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol30/iss2/10
344 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX
There are additional problems involved in Rule 17(b) outside the scope
of this note, which suggest the need for a complete integrated revision of
the rule.9" Because of the apparent continuing validity, despite Almond,
of incapacity statutes for certain individuals, such as minors or the men-
tally incompetent,9' the rule should not be amended to establish a blanket
authorization of capacity for all individuals. Rather, the rule should pro-
vide that federal standards shall determine the capacity of individuals to
sue or be sued under federal law. The 1966 amendments9" to Federal
Rules 19 (joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication) and 23 (class
actions) indicate that a realistic approach might be to state the factors
which a federal court should consider in deciding capacity questions in
such cases. One such factor should be that the federal court should strive
to apply the same capacity law it would apply in a diversity case when
this is feasible.93 However, when federal claims are involved, the federal
courts should be permitted to allow capacity to litigate upon such condi-
tions as are just when compliance with state law would be unreasonable,
would destroy the jurisdiction of the federal court, or would effectively
deny a forum for a remedy.94
Such an amendment to Rule 17(b) would spare the federal courts the
task of examining the legislative history of state incapacity statutes, mak-
ing fine distinctions between total incapacity, suspended capacity, and
formal incapacity, or deciding whether the judicially-created exception to
Rule 17(b) in section 1983 actions should apply to suits brought under
other federal substantive statutes.
A. J. ALEXIS GELINAS
THE DOCTRINE OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND
SECTION 1983: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM
The doctrine of immunity of public officials from personal liability
frequently clashes with the right of private citizens to seek redress for
injuries caused by those officials. There is a need for protection of public
officials from harassment and the resultant hazards of damage suits
"KENNEDY at 310-16.
"Text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
'"See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 71-72 (2d ed. 1970).
"Rule 17(b) currently provides that an individual's capacity to litigate is to be deter-
mined by the law of his domicile. Note 77 supra. However, in revising Rule 17(b), it might
be more desirable in light of the Erie doctrine to require a federal court in a diversity case
to apply the capacity law of the state in which it sits. See Urbano v. News Syndicate Co.,
358 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
9"Cf KENNEDY at 316.
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brought by anyone who may feel himself injured by officials' acts.' But
this public need conflicts with the right of a citizen to seek compensation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries caused by deprivations of constitu-
tional rights.2 The common law doctrine of immunity protects public
officials, while § 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations of civil
rights to private citizens.' A literal reading of § 1983 admits of no ex-
ceptions to state officials who may be reached under it.4 The greatest
tension in the common law doctrine of immunity occurs between the
doctrine and § 1983's apparent exception to it.
The purpose of the doctrine of immunity is to protect the broad use
of discretion for those officials who must exercise judgment in their du-
ties. 5 Public officers in the higher government positions generally exercise
a broader range of responsibilities and a wider scope of discretion than
do those in the lower echelons.' For instance, the immunity of federal
legislators (who exercise wide discretion in every legislative act) is pro-
'See Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1964).
'See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). With reference to the federal right
created by § 1983, Mr. Justice Douglas stated in his majority opinion:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation [§ 1983] was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of preju-
dice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be
enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be de-
nied by the state agencies.
Id.
342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
1Id. The section by its very language purports to impose liability for certain acts upon
"[e]very person."
5See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950),
where Judge Learned Hand commented:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden
of a trial . . . would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Id. at 581.
4See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-76 (1959). A recent opinion confirming the
validity of the doctrine of official immunity, the Matteo case involved a common law tort
action for libel against the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization. The Court
held that the application of the doctrine of immunity to a cabinet officer in Spalding v.
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), should be extended to executive officers of lower rank. In doing
so the Court added the caveat that the higher officers exercise greater responsibility and
discretion than do those at a lower level.
1973]
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vided for in the Constitution,7 whereas clerks of court and policemen are
probably nearer the bottom of the scale in the exercise of discretion. Of
course, a particular official may perform some duties which require dis-
cretion and some which do not. For example, in Florida, municipal court
clerks, in addition to their specifically directed duties of receiving fines
and preparing court dockets and records, are authorized to determine
probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, a purely discretionary
function." A municipal court clerk in Florida might therefore be found
liable for filing papers (a non-discretionary function) improperly, but be
protected against claims arising from his determination of probable
cause.
The conflict between the doctrine of immunity and § 1983 stems
from the fact that the application of the statute is not limited only to those
officials who perform non-discretionary functions.' Section 1983 was
originally enacted ° to provide private citizens a remedy in federal courts
against any state official who neglected or refused to enforce a complain-
ant's constitutional rights." The Reconstruction years between 1865 and
1871 had seen the rise to power of the Ku Klux Klan in southern states
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The section provides in part:
They [senators and representatives] shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech and Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
'See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 168.04 (1966).
'Notes 3 & 4 supra. The broad application of the statute admits of no exceptions.
'"Originally enacted as ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), the section was part of the Ku
Klux Klan Act, entitled by Congress, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes."
"The purpose of the act was stated by Representative Lowe on the floor of the House
during debates pursuant to passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871:
[Rlecords of the [state] tribunals are searched in vain for evidence of
effective redresss [of federally secured rights] . . . . What less than . . .
[the Civil Rights Act of 1871] will afford an adequate remedy. . . . The
case has arisen . . . when the Federal Government must resort to its own
agencies to carry its own authority into effect.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-41 (1972), quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 374-76 (1871) Representative Perry expressed his opinion for the need for the act as
follows:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges having ears to hear, hear not;
witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they
might be accomplices . . . all the apparatus and machinery of civil gov-
ernment, all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and
justice were crimes and feared detection.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 241 (1972), quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
App. 78 (1871).
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and the failure of state governmental agencies (through fear or neglect)
to prevent or redress wrongs suffered by citizens, 2 and Congress reacted
by enacting a broad measure, unlimited in its application to classes of
state officials.'3 The present form of § 1983 is virtually unchanged since
1871. The purpose of § 1983, as originally envisioned by Congress,
would doubtless be nullified by a wide application of immunity to state
officials which would, in effect, amount to a judicial repeal of § 1983.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has directed that § 1983 not
be read literally so as to allow all state officials to be reached under the
section. In Pierson v. Ray," the Court held that judges were to be granted
immunity in § 1983 damage actions. In reaching its decision, the Court
reviewed the common law doctrine of judicial immunity and observed
that the doctrine was one of the most solidly established doctrines at
common law, its primary purpose being to preserve the independence of
the judiciary in its decision making, free of intimidation by potential
damage suits. 5 It existed for the benefit of the public whose interest is
best served by a strong judiciary, free even against claims of malice or
corruption." Concluding that the legislative record of the enactment
"Remarks by Senator Pratt of Indiana, during debates pursuant to passage of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, described conditions in the southern states:
But it is a fact, asserted in the report, that of hundreds of outrages
committed on loyal people through the agency of this Ku Klux organiza-
tion not one has been punished.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 178 (1961), quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
505 (1871).
1342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
14386 U.S. 547 (1967). In 1961 a group of black and white clergymen travelled from
Detroit to Mississippi for the purpose of challenging the segregation laws of that state. They
were arrested in the local segregated bus facilities by local police officers, charged under
state law with unlawful congregation in the bus terminal, and found guilty by one Spencer,
a municipal police justice. On appeal the county court overturned their convictions, and they
initiated § 1983 actions against Spencer and the arresting officers. In the district court the
jury returned verdicts for the judge and police officers. On appeal the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that Spencer was immune from liability because he was a judge. 352
F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1965).
151d. at 554. The Court relied heavily on Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1871). Although Bradley was decided subsequent to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, it
served as a clear statement of the doctrine of judicial immunity at common law and became
a cornerstone of the doctrine. The Court in Bradley based its decision in large part on
English common law and observed that England had observed the doctrine for centuries,
citing Floyd & Barker, 12 Coke 25 (1608).
"8Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). The court stated:
If civil actions could be maintained in such cases against the judge, be-
cause the losing party should see fit to allege in his complaint that the acts
of the judge were done with partiality, or maliciously, or corruptly, the
protection essential to judicial independence would be swept away. Few
1973]
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of § 1983 indicates no clear intention of Congress "to abolish wholesale
all common-law immunities,"' 7 the Court held that judges are immune
from damage actions, notwithstanding the broad wording of § 1983. Al-
though the case was limited to the issue of judicial immunity from dam-
ages, the reference of the Court to "all common-law immunities" sug-
gests that § 1983 must, to some extent, always be read in the light of the
doctrine of official immunity. The Court's limited decision left undecided
the extent of the protection to be afforded other officials against whom
an action is brought under § 1983. Thus, the problem facing the courts
is to determine at what point the public need for protection of its officials
outweighs the right of redress under § 1983 when such an action is
brought.
In McCray v. Maryland,18 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
fronted the immunity - § 1983 dilemma as it applied to a clerk of court
in Maryland. The appellant in McCray filed a complaint pro se alleging
that the clerk of the Baltimore City Court, through negligence, had
impeded the progress of his petition for post-conviction relief by failing
to file it properly, but the appellant did not plead violation of a federal
right or statute. In dismissing the complaint, the district court concluded
that the allegation of negligence without an allegation of a violation of a
federally protected right was not sufficient to state a claim
under § 1983."9 The district court further held that even if the claim had
been sufficiently stated, a clerk of court is absolutely immune from suit
because he is a quasi-judicial officer and thus cloaked with judicial im-
munity.
20
In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Sobeloff, decided first whether the complaint stated a cause of
action independent of the clerk's defense of immunity. Viewing the com-
plaint with the liberality customarily afforded prose pleadings, 2' the court
found a cause of action to have been stated because the complaint suffi-
persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his
judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which
would be essential to the maintenance of the action.
Id. at 348.
17386 U.S. at 554. The Court adopted the reasoning of Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951), in which state legislators had been held immune from suit under § 1983. In
Tenney the Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to abolish the common law
doctrine of immunity for legislators, it would have done so expressly; because the immunity
of judges is equally well established, the Court in Pierson presumed Congress would have
specifically abolished the immunity if that had been its intent. 386 U.S. at 554-55.





ciently alleged that appellant's constitutionally based right of access to
the courts had been violated2 2-a denial of a right redressable
under § 1983.2 Having established the sufficiency of the complaint, the
court then concluded that the clerk was not immune from suit. The court
referred to the applicable state statutes24 and found that the filing of
papers was a ministerial duty which did not require the exercise of discre-
tion: the clerk was required to file all papers? The court also found that
the state of Maryland had imposed a penalty of $200 on the clerk for
negligently or wilfully failing to perform his ministerial duties. " Since the
state did not feel compelled to protect the clerk in certain of his duties,
the court reasoned that a federal cause of action also would not be inhibi-
tory to the clerk or contrary to expressed state policy?
Because the clerk's duties were so clearly ministerial,28 and because
of the existence of the punitive statute, the decision in McCray was not
particularly difficult to reach, but the conflict between the doctrine of
immunity and § 1983 is not always easy to resolve. Courts must some-
how weigh the competing interests to determine when the doctrine of
immunity will shield an official from suit under § 1983. Generally the
intensity of these interests will vary with the position held by an official
in the public hierarchy.
At the upper levels of officials, the superior public interest in official
immunity has been made evident by the Supreme CourtY.2 Such officials
are granted immunity not because of the importance of their positions but
because of the public interest in the unfettered exercise of their discre-
tion." Thus, in Tenney v. Brandhove,31 the Supreme Court held that
2id. at 6. On this point the court relied upon decisions in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 376 (1971) and Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
2Id. at 6.
2
'MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, §§ I, 32 (Repl. vol. 1966).
"MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § I (Repl. vol. 1966). The statute states:
Every clerk shall have the custody of the books and papers pertaining
to his office, and shall carefully keep current and preserve the same; he
shall file all papers delivered to him to be filed, and shall record all
judgments, decrees, deeds and writings which by law are required to be
recorded in the office of which he is clerk. ...
"MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § 32 (Repl. vol. 1966). The statute states:
[I]f any clerk of a court shall neglect or refuse to make proper entries
of all proceedings in the court of which he is clerk, all as required by law
or by the Maryland Rules, said clerk shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall forfeit the sum of two hundred dollars for the use of the State.
1456 F.2d at 4.
"See note 25 supra.
"See note 6 supra.
'See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959).
31341 U.S. 367 (1951). In Tenney a state legislator was sued for his acts as chairman
1973]
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state legislators are immune from suit under § 1983 from claims which
arise incident to their legislative functions. In the case of the legislator,




Likewise, one rationale for immunity given to judges from § 1983
suits in Pierson is that here, too, a sufficient remedy for constitutional
wrongs exists in the form of appeal, and while the route of appeal will
not compensate wrongs, it will restore the individual's rights which have
been infringed by a judge.33 The single, somewhat obscure qualification
of judicial immunity is that judges' acts, to be protected, must be done
"within their jurisdiction. ' 34 An early use of this concept came where
immunity was denied to a state judge who was indicted for refusal to
select blacks for jury duty. 3 The Supreme Court held that he was not
performing a judicial act, for which the protection of immunity was
required, but that he was performing an act that might have been accom-
plished by a non-judicial officer such as a court clerk or bailiff.3" It would
of a state legislature investigative committee on un-American activities. The Court held that
the defendant was acting within a proper legislative function in the performance of the acts
on which suit was brought. The Court quoted from a member of the Committee of Detail,
the body responsible for the constitutional provision (note 7 supra) protecting legislators:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to dis-
charge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably neces-
sary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should
be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom
the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.
Id. at 373.
121d. at 378.
-See Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 HARv.
L. REV. 1229, 1237 (1955).
3'Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871). Only those acts which are done
pursuant to an exercise of jurisdiction over the subject matter are to be protected by
immunity. When a judge acts without jurisdiction over the subject matter, his acts are not
protected.
35Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
'Id. at 348. The breadth ascribed to a judge's jurisdiction is illustrated in MeAlester
v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972). In McAlester appellants (husband and wife) went
to the county courthouse where their son was to stand trial on criminal charges. They
alleged that when they inquired at the judge's office as to the time of the trial, he lost his
temper and ordered them to leave. When they didn't leave promptly, the judge had the
husband jailed, and the husband was not tried for contempt of court for a period of almost
two months. Appellants brought a damage action against the judge under § 1983 alleging
that the husband was imprisoned without due process of law. The district court dismissed
the action on the ground that the judge was acting within his jurisdiction and was thus
immune from liability under the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the judge was acting within his jurisdiction. The court based
its determination on four factors: (1) the use of contempt power is a normal judicial
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seem to be a rare case, however, where a judge, under this test, would be
subject to a § 1983 cause of action. "Jurisdiction" is broadly defined to
include not only a judge's usual actions from the bench, but also decisions
rendered in chambers, or in almost any circumstance connected with the
normal activity or conduct of a judge.
31
While little doubt remains as to the immunity of legislators and judges
from damage actions under § 1983, the resolution of the conflict is not
so clear as it applies to officers at the lower levels of government where
the exercise of discretion is not as significant and is often less well defined.
For example, a prosecuting attorney exercises a great deal of discretion
in determining whom to charge with a crime and what crime he will
charge.3 A prosecutor was found to be immune from suit where he
erroneously charged a defendant with an adult crime when in fact the
accused was a minor.39 Yet a prosecutor has been held liable for a
violation of rights allegedly committed while he was acting as an investi-
gative officer."0
One possible source of inconsistency in the opinions is the tendency
of courts to characterize duties of officials by attaching common-law
labels to them and to base decisions on the category into which the
specific duty falls. Chief among these characterizations is the term "dis-
cretionary" which is used to describe those duties which require the exer-
cise of judgment and independent decision making.4 The antithesis of the
term discretionary is the term "ministerial," which is used to describe
duties which do not require the exercise of discretion but rather are
specifically required of an official,42 such as a registrar of deeds who has
no alternative but to file correctly submitted deeds.43 The label "quasi-
judicial" is also frequently applied and usually refers to administrative
function; (2) the alleged events occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the controversy in-
volved a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the controversy occurred during a visit
to the judge in an official capacity. Id. at 1282.
"7 Cf. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1871).
"SSee Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
391d.
"Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965). The immunity granted a prosecu-
tor is derived from his close identification with the judicial process. To ensure that he may
act freely in his functions, the prosecutor is granted immunity similar to that of judges.
When a prosecutor acts in some capacity outside of his integral relationship with the judicial
process, the need for his protection ceases to exist. If he acts as an investigator he is entitled
to no more protection than a police officer, who is liable if he has acted to deny another of
his federally protected rights. Accord, Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
"See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782,447 P.2d 352,356,73 Cal. Rptr. 240,244 (1968).
"See Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221, 231 (1900).
"'See Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N.D. 478, 121 N.W. 616 (1909); Johnson v. Brice, 102
Wis. 575, 78 N.W. 1086 (1899).
19731
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officers who exercise judgment in the course of their duties." Insofar as
his duties extend to determining the cause of a fire, a fire marshal may
be a quasi-judicial officer. 5 While these labels may be employed to assist
a court in deciding whether or not to grant immunity, they are conclusion-
ary: it is one thing to discuss discretion, it is an entirely different matter
to find it. It is a rare act, a judge once said, which does not require at
least some discretion, "even if it involve[s] only the driving of a nail."46
All too often, it seems, a court will summarily conclude, without analysis,
that an officer is a quasi-judicial official and go no further in its discussion
of immunity." The Fourth Circuit in McCray v. Maryland, however,
must be excepted from this criticism.
The court in McCray did refer to the clerk's duties as ministerial, but
it applied the label only after determining the exact nature of his duties
from the state statute." Having determined that the clerk's duties were
ministerial in nature and that officials were not immune at common law
for duties which are mandatory, the court found no basis in common law
or state policy for protecting the clerk by immunity. 9 In referring to the
common law approach, the court applied the term ministerial only after
it had analyzed the duties of the clerk in terms of the facts and the
Maryland statute.
In its analysis of the facts, the court in McCray relied strongly upon
the recent District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Carter v.
Carlson. ° The Carter court approached the conflict between immunity
"See Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REV.
261 (1935).
"SSee Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1938).
"Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 P. 462,468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
"7See Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1968); Henig v. Odorioso, 256 F.
Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1966), affd, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016
(1968). In both cases defendants were court employees. The courts made reference to quasi-
judicial immunity and granted dismissal of the complaints. Neither court examined the acts
alleged by plaintiffs to be injurious or considered the purpose behind the doctrine of immun-
ity. Furthermore, the courts applied the term "quasi-judicial" to those officers whose duties
were merely related to the judicial process-not forming an integral part of the process as
do the duties of a prosecutor-thus stripping the label of its most limited usefulness. 405
F.2d at 487; 256 F. Supp. at 281.
11456 F.2d at 4.
'1d.
'447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 41 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1973). Plaintiff alleged that he was arrested by
police officer Carlson without probable cause and was beaten by that officer while two
others held him. He brought an action against Carlson, Carlson's precinct captain, the Chief
of Police, and the District of Columbia under common law tort theories and § 1983.
Plaintiff alleged that the senior police officials and the District of Columbia were negligent
in failing to train Carlson properly. He further alleged that the District of Columbia was
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and § 1983 by first considering the precise function of the defendant
official which gave rise to the § 1983 action and then determining
whether the threat of liability would "unduly inhibit" the official in the
performance of that function."'
Since not all factual situations before the courts will involve a statute
to which the courts may resort in ascertaining what is, or is not, unduly
inhibitory, it would seem that courts should consider a number of factors
underlying the bringing of a suit. For example, short of the threat of
financial loss resulting from allowance of a suit, an important factor
might be the detrimental effect of the time consuming nature of litigation.
Courts might consider the degree of inhibition of an official caused by
the threat of loss of time spent in litigation in determining whether a
particular class of officials should be subject to litigation. An official
subject to suit at any time is unable to function efficiently if he must
devote much time to defending himself, 2 and the mere threat of litigation
may be sufficient to deter him from acting vigorously 3 It would be an
unusual parole board member who would not be inhibited one way or
another if faced with continuous suits for his decisions to deny parole.
While he might not fear that an action against him could be successfully
brought, he might surrender a degree of his independent judgment in
favor of making his decisions less apt to give rise to the need to defend
himself in court frequently.54
Courts might also look to remedies in previous § 1983 actions to
determine if prior awards have been exceptionally high. Certainly few
state officers could fail to be intimidated by the threat of a judgment of
responsible for the torts of Carlson and the police officials on a theory of respondeat
superior. The district court dismissed the complaint against all defendants without explana-
tion. On plaintiffs appeal the superior officials interposed the defense of 6fficial immunity.
111d. at 362.
"See Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972). The court in this case
recognized one purpose of the doctrine of immunity to be the elimination of time an official
must spend defending himself. However, that case involved a claim for injunctive relief
under § 1983 brought against two judges, a prosecutor, and the prosecutor's assistant.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of their class (persons of Cairo and Alexander County, Illinois, and
presumably blacks, and poor) complained that defendants had systematically used state
laws to discriminate against them by depriving them of their constitutional rights. The court
felt that the use of the class action would reduce the number of cases a prosecutor would
have to defend, and that the number of potential class actions against him for discrimination
predictably would be small. Furthermore, in this case the claim of defendants was not
insubstantial and went right to the heart of the prosecutor's duties: the even-handed, non-
discriminatory enforcement of the laws. Thus the court reversed the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint and remanded it to the lower court. Id. at 413.
'3See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
"Note 5 supra.
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thousands of dollars against them. For example, the clerk of the Balti-
more City Court, who was the defendant in McCray, is authorized an
annual salary of between $12,000 and $20,000.11 A damage judgment of a
few thousand dollars against him would represent a substantial portion
of a year's income. Section 1983 itself makes no limitation on potential
damages, and none has been developed by the courts. Proper damages
for deprivation of rights are difficult to ascertain; in the absence of any
limit, it is impossible to say that damages in a particular suit might not
be substantial, especially if punitive damages were to be awarded." The
absence of readily ascertainable damage awards will not prevent the
bringing of a suit because the courts may fashion relief on any available
remedy.
5 7
Notwithstanding the above considerations which might favor applica-
tion of the doctrine of immunity, in some circumstances the sanctions
of § 1983 for violations of rights may frequently serve the public interest
more effectively than would the immunity of officials. Certainly the intent
of Congress in enacting the legislation in 1871 was to provide some
remedy against public officials. Section 1983 has been successfully used
to redress and restore the right to vote59 and to seek damages against
discrimination in hiring"0 and against illegal search and seizure."' The
public interest in these critical constitutional areas might be served better
by officials who act cautiously in the shadow of § 1983 than by officials
who have no fear of personal liability, even if they should violate an
individual's basic constitutional rights.
A final factor, which the court in McCray considered, is the effect of
a § 1983 suit in federal court might have upon state-federal relationships.
Concern for the uninhibited functioning of state judicial proceedings has
caused federal courts to abstain from enjoining such proceedings," even
"
5MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § 23(d) (Supp. 1971).
"6See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965). Granting the difficulty of proof
of damages for a violation of a constitutional right, high punitive damages may be awarded
even in the absence of nominal damages.
"TBell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); see Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569-70 (1930).
5 See notes II & 12 supra.
"Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
"Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).
"Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
"2This concern for the untrammeled functioning of state court proceedings was origi-
nally found in the Judiciary Act, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335 (1793). The present form of the
anti-injunction statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 225
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of 226
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 227
effectuate its judgments.
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though the state action itself is allegedly violative of constitutional rights
under § 1983.13 One of the justifications for abstention in such cases is
that state officials should be free to carry out the laws of their state
without fear of interference from federal court orders." This is one ration-
ale that appears, at least implicitly, to have been used to preclude § 1983
damage actions against state officials." However, even in the face of the
strong policy of federal abstention from interference with state court
proceedings, certain § 1983 actions have been allowed, particularly
where first amendment rights have been involved." In these cases it has
been felt that the importance of the right involved and the possibility of
irreparable harm from prosecution in the state court justify the interfer-
ence in spite of the well-established policy of federal court abstention
from injunctions of state court proceedings." It would seem that, by
analogy, the significance of the right involved in a § 1983 damage action
6Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger the state of California had
indicted Harris under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He sought an injunction
against the state prosecution, claiming that because of such prosecution he would suffer
immediate and irreparable harm. A three-judge federal district court granted an injunction,
holding that the state Criminal Syndicalism Act was unconstitutionally void for vagueness
and overbreadth. 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (1968). In reversing the lower court's decision, the
Supreme Court stressed the force of the policy against injunctions of state proceedings and
stated that such injunctions could only be ordered where the petitioner could show that great
and immediate irreparable harm would result from the prosecution. The only injury that
Harris faced from state prosecution was incidental to any other lawful criminal proceeding
and was not sufficient to justify a federal injunction of the prosecutiom The state court was
a suitable forum to protect Harris' first amendment rights. Id. at 49.
6 See 401 U.S. at 44. The Court discussed reasons for the policy against injunctions of
state court proceedings and emphasized the importance of "comity," which constitutes
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.
"See Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021
(1967).
6 6Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
"See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). In Mitchum the Supreme Court
ruled for the first time that Congress intended to "interpose the federal courts between the
states and the people" through § 1983. Id. For that reason it authorized federal courts to
issue injunctions of state court proceedings by authorizing "suits in equity." See note 3
supra. Thus § 1983 is an act of Congress within the exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
See note 62 supra. The Court repeated, the caveat of earlier cases that federal injunctive
relief against state court proceedings is proper only when it is necessary "to prevent great,
immediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights." 407 U.S. at 242. The
Court further emphasized that it did not question or qualify principles of comity and
federalism by its decision.
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